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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper looks at the impact of population dynamics on poverty in elderly-
headed households in the Philippines using data from the Family Income and 
Expenditure Survey (FIES) from 2000 to 2006. The population of the elderly, or 
those 60 years and above, has increased from 3.2 million in 1990 to 4.6 million in 
2000. This group is growing at a rate of 3.6% per annum and estimated to reach 7 
million in 2010.  Data from the FIES shows that the percentage of the elderly who 
are poor is increasing since 2003. Moreover, the percentage of elderly-headed 
household belonging to the poorest 10% of all households has been on the rise 
since 1997. An econometric model based on the logistic regression shows that the 
presence of a young dependent (aged 14 years old or below) increases the 
probability that the elderly-headed household will become poor by about 9 
percentage points, controlling for other factors such as income of the household, 
education, age and gender of the household head, income transfer from abroad 
and regional-specific characteristics. The results of the econometric model 
suggest that the high proportion of young dependents create negative effects on 
the welfare of the elderly-headed household by increasing the probability of that 
household being poor. From the point of view of policy, addressing the alarming 
poverty incidence in the country must include measures that will manage the 
country’s bourgeoning population and bring down the fertility rate to a level that 
is conducive to higher income growth. 
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I.  Introduction 
The country’s performance in reducing poverty over the last three decades has been 
disappointing despite the many programs and past efforts of the national and local governments. 
The poverty incidence in the country in 2006, as officially measured using the headcount ratio, 
was at 32.9%, translating to about 28 million Filipinos who are poor. On the hunger mitigation 
efforts, the figures released by the Social Weather Stations (SWS) for the 4th quarter of 2010, 
“found the proportion of families experiencing involuntary hunger at least once in the past three 
months up to 18.1%, or an estimated 3.4 million families” (SWS, 2011). The 4th quarter hunger 
incidence is higher compared to the 12-year average of about 13.7%.  
 
What might explain such dismal performance in poverty reduction and hunger mitigation 
efforts through these years? A quick answer is the country’s poor economic growth performance. 
The Philippines’ economic growth performance is no match relative to its East Asian neighbors, 
as shown in table 1. For example, Thailand’s average growth rate in per capita Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) from 1961 to 1990 is almost twice compared to the Philippines’ growth. It was 
only in the 1990s that the gap in the growth rates between the two countries narrowed.   What are 
the reasons for the country’s feeble long run economic growth? An often-deliberated factor for 
this slow economic growth is the country’s bourgeoning population.  
The population debate, on whether a slower population growth6 is good or bad for 
economic growth and the well-being of the Filipinos in general, continues to be contentious in 
the Philippines. Those opposed to the idea of slowing down the country’s population growth 
argue on two issues: first, that there is no connection between population growth and economic 
development (population growth has nothing to do with economic growth; the cause of poverty 
lies elsewhere) and second, slowing down our population growth now will create a bigger 
problem in the future – the demographic winter, when a large percentage of the population 
consists of the elderly. The first argument has been disproven by the empirical findings (see 
Mapa and Balisacan, 2004; Mapa, 2009) which show that rapid population growth indeed 
hinders economic growth, even controlling for other factors that affect growth such as quality of 
public institutions (measure of corruption) and education of the individuals.  
Table 1. Comparative Economic Performance for Selected Countries in East Asia 
  Per capita GDP (PPP)   Per capita GDP growth   Population growth 
  1980 1990 2000 2009   1961-70 1971-90 1991-2009   1961-70 1971-90 1991-2009 
China 524 1,101 2,667 6,200   4.65 7.82 10.47   2.02 1.64 0.84 
Japan 18,647 25,946 28,605 29,688   10.47 4.22 0.90   1.02 0.84 0.17 
Korea, Rep. 5,544 11,383 18,730 25,493   8.26 8.02 5.11   2.49 1.47 0.68 
Hong Kong SAR, China 13,945 23,697 29,785 40,599   10.19 8.24 4.25   2.67 1.83 1.08 
Philippines 2,618 2,385 2,587 3,216   4.93 3.86 3.71   3.02 2.67 2.04 
Thailand 2,231 3,961 5,568 7,258   8.17 7.39 4.32   2.97 2.11 0.94 
Indonesia 1,361 2,087 2,727 3,813   4.18 7.14 4.75   2.27 2.08 1.37 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Databank http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do 
                                               
6
 Most economists and demographers in the Philippines agree that an ideal population growth should coincide with 
the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) that is neither too high nor too low. This fertility rate that is consistent with stable 
population is about 2.1, also known as the replacement rate of fertility. The latest TFR based on the 2008 National 
Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) is 3.3.  
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The core idea which links population and economic growth is demographic transition 
described as “a change from a situation of high fertility and high mortality to one of low fertility 
and low mortality.” A country that enters into a demographic transition experiences sizable 
changes in the age distribution of the population and this affects economic growth. Demographic 
transition has three phases and each phase has a different impact on the economy.  
 
 In the course of the demographic transition, countries experience an increasing share of 
the working age population relative to the total population and this creates favorable effects on 
the per capita income. Mason and Lee (2006) refer to this effect of the demographic transition on 
income growth as the “first dividend.” The conclusion is that countries with a population 
structure with heavy concentration at the working–age group have the advantage of producing 
high levels of per capita income, all things being the same. Cross-country and intra-country 
econometric analyses (Mapa and Balisacan, 2004; Mapa, Balisacan and  Briones; 2006) have 
shown that the Philippines has not benefited from the so-called demographic dividend that is a 
major contributor to the economic success experienced by East Asian countries from the 1960s 
to 1990s (refer to Table 1) 
 In addition to the first dividend, Mason (2007) discusses another form of dividend 
resulting from the changing age-structure of the nation’s population and refers to it as the second 
demographic dividend. The second dividend results from the society’s response to the prospect 
of an aging population, an outcome as the nation’s age structure enters into the third phase of the 
demographic transition. The challenge faced by societies (and governments) when there is a 
substantial percentage of the elderly population is on how to support their consumption, given a 
reduction in their income. There are common approaches to this problem. These include: (a) 
relying on public (or familial) transfer systems and (b) increasing saving rates and accumulating 
greater physical wealth or capital. Individuals accumulate saving in their working years and this 
serves as buffer during the retirement years. While accumulation of capital can be used to deal 
with the life-cycle deficit in the older ages, this capital also influences economic growth. As 
Mason points out, it is when society increases its saving rate that more rapid economic growth 
results, creating the second demographic dividend.  
 
Demographic Winter – The Population Bogeyman 
Having failed to argue against the impact of population growth on economic growth (now 
a widely accepted result), those against population management are now warning us of the 
catastrophic implications of slowing down our population growth–the demographic winter or 
when the country’s population is ageing.  
Magsino (2010), for example, argues the possibility of extinction as a result of slowing 
population growth, claiming that countries with negative population growth are “literally 
disappearing from the world.” Montalban II (2008) paints a bleak picture of our future 
population where majority will be “aged, infirm and geriatric”. Villegas (2010) erroneously 
claims, that the Philippines would “start to show the makings of an inverted pyramid which now 
characterizes aging countries like Japan, Spain, Italy and South Korea.”7 
                                               
7
 This statement was based on Dr. Villegas’ incorrect assertion that 146,582 babies were added to the data for the 
census year 2000. Dr. Villegas has since issued a public apology for his statement.   
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But are these arguments supported by facts? The data suggest that talk of a demographic 
winter occurring in the Philippines soon is greatly exaggerated and is being used as a tactic to 
create fear in the people’s mind (Alonzo, et.al, 2004). Studies have shown, using relevant and 
appropriate assumptions, that the replacement fertility rate of 2.1 will be reached at the earliest in 
2030 (Mapa, Balisacan and Corpuz, 2010) or the latest in 2040 (Concepcion, 2004). Moreover, 
the effects of the population momentum will continue for about 60 more years before the 
population growth becomes zero and by that time, the country’s total population will be above 
200 million.8 
This paper contends that the fear of the demographic winter occurring in the country very 
soon is without basis and that our current population dynamics resulting from a high population 
growth is, in reality, negatively affecting the welfare of our elderly making them vulnerable to 
poverty.  
II.  The Elderly in the Philippines: Population and Poverty Scenarios 
The elderly population (Filipinos aged 60 years and above) increased from 3.2 million in 
1990 to 4.6 million in 2000. The elderly group in our country is growing at a rate of 3.6% every 
year and their number is expected to hit 7.0 million in 2010. By then, our elderly will account for 
about 7.4% of our total population. 
 
A study by Cruz and Cruz (2010) showed that the Philippines can still be considered as a 
country with a young population where the percentage of those aged 65 years and above is less 
than 5%.9 Moreover, it will only enter the initial phase of the aging population in 2040 when the 
percentage of those aged 65 years and above is 9.6% of the total population (the percentage of 
those aged 60 years and above will be 13.8% of the population). The results of the study by Cruz 
and Cruz clearly show that the so-called demographic winter will not be a concern for the 
Philippines for at least one generation. In the meantime, the damage that a rapid population 
growth (slow economic growth and high poverty incidence) will bring to this generation and the 
next are irreversible.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
8
 Population Momentum refers to the tendency for population growth to continue beyond the time that replacement-
level fertility has been achieved because of a relatively high concentration of people in the childbearing years. 
This phenomenon is due to past high fertility rates which results in a large number of young people. As these 
youth grow older and move through reproductive ages, the greater number of births will exceed the number of 
deaths in the older populations (World Bank). 
9
 A population is considered as “young” if people aged 65 years and older comprise less than 5 percent of the total 
population; it is considered as “old” if the proportion of 65 years and above is 10 percent or more. 
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   Figure 1. Population of the Elderly from 1990 to 2010* 
 
     Source: National Statistics Office (NSO); * Projected Population for 2010 
 
Poverty estimates using the data from the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES) 
show that the percentage of the elderly-headed household that are considered as poor has been 
increasing since 2003, following the general trend of the increasing percentage of Filipinos who 
are poor. The figures show that about 20.68% of the elderly-headed households are considered as 
poor in 2000, the number decreased in 2003 to 19.33% and increased again in 2006 to 22.02%.  
 
With the triple shocks that hit the country in the last two years: (a) the food crisis in 2008, 
(b) the global financial crisis in 2008 and (c) the natural calamities brought about by the 
typhoons in 2009, economists (see Balisacan, 2009) estimate that the percentage of poor 
Filipinos will remain high. It is not difficult to infer that the same scenario for the percentage of 
elderly-headed households who are poor.  
 
While the percentage of elderly-headed households belonging to the poorest income 
group has been increasing, the percentage of elderly-headed households belonging to the highest 
income group has been decreasing, as shown in Figure 2 below. On the one hand, the percentage 
of elderly in the lowest-income deciles (poorest 10%) increased from 15.21% in 1991 to 18.45% 
in 2003. On the other hand, the percentage of elderly-headed household in the highest income 
class (richest 10%) decreased from 13.42% in 1991 to 9.97% in 2003. This shows that the 
welfare of the elderly-headed households has been deteriorating through the years. 
 
This paper will present empirical evidence showing that presence of young dependents in 
the household (aged 0 to 14 years) increases the vulnerability of the elderly-headed household to 
poverty. It will show that rapid population growth affects the welfare of the elderly-headed 
household and that addressing the population problem now will not bring upon us the threat of 
demographic winter but will, in fact, improve the well-being of the elderly-headed household. 
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 FIGURE 2.Percentage of the Elderly-Headed Households in the Income Deciles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Sources: FIES, NSO and Authors’ Computation 
  
 
Rapid Population Growth Restricts Overall Saving Rate 
 
 To empirically test that the Philippines has not benefitted from the second demographic 
dividend due to its high population growth, Mapa and Bersales (2008) worked on an econometric 
model estimating the effects of the population dynamics, particularly the impact of the young 
population (0 to 14 years) and the elderly population, on the aggregate household saving rate, 
using regional panel data from 1985 to 2003. 
 In effect, the paper looks at the role of the slow demographic transition in the Philippines’ 
aggregate household saving rate. The econometric model for saving used the augmented life-
cycle model to explain the saving behavior of the household. The life-cycle model predicts that 
both demographic variable and productivity growth will generate savings. During the first phase 
of the demographic transition the young dependent population (aged 0 to 14) is growing faster 
relative to the working-age population resulting in higher household consumption, which in turn 
diminishes the rate of saving (Coale and Hoover, 1956). During the second phase of the 
demographic transition, the working-age population is growing relative to the young dependent 
population resulting in higher saving rate. 
 
The results of the study showed that the percentage of young dependents (aged 0 to 14 
years) has a negative and significant impact on aggregate household saving rate. A one-
percentage point reduction in the proportion of young dependents (say due to a policy that 
reduces fertility rate) results in an increase in the average saving rate by 0.34 percentage-point, 
controlling for other factors. The study also showed that the proportion of the elderly has a 
positive and significant impact on the aggregate household saving rate. In particular, a  one 
percentage-point increase in the proportion of the elderly results in an estimated increase of 0.95 
percentage-point in the average saving rate, all things being the same. 
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 The Mapa and Bersales paper showed that the second demographic dividend is real and 
the Philippines missed out on this opportunity to increase its overall economic growth due to its 
unsustainable population growth. 
 
Population Dynamics and the Welfare of the Elderly 
 
 What is the mechanism that links the rapid population growth to the welfare of the 
elderly? Using the idea behind the second demographic dividend, the elderly accumulate savings 
during their working-age years to serve as buffer in their retirement years. However, if the 
population continues to grow fast, resulting in a very slow demographic transition, then the 
percentage of the young dependents will continue to be high. This will hinder the saving rate of 
the elderly, particularly when the elderly is not just supporting a single family (his children) but 
an extended family (his children and grandchildren) as well. 
 
The national household saving rates, as shown in figure 3 below, have been on the 
decline since 1997. The data from the FIES shows that in 2006, the average national household 
saving rate (light bars) is only 15.2%, much lower than the peak of 21% recorded in 1988. The 
average saving rate of the elderly headed household (dark bars), while higher than the national 
average in 2006 at 18%, is also lower than the peak in 1988 (26%) and has been on the decline 
since 1997 when the average saving rate of the elderly-headed household was 23.7%. In should 
be noted that if the life-cycle hypothesis holds, the saving rate is highest among working-age 
individuals and low among the elderly. High saving rate of elderly, as shown in figure 3, 
suggests that the bequest motive for saving among the elderly is strong.    
 
FIGURE 3. Aggregate Household Savings Rate (by FIES years) 
 
Sources: FIES, NSO and Authors’ Computations 
 
 Mapa, Davila and Albis (2010) studied the saving patterns of elderly-headed households 
using pooled data from the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES) for the years 1985, 
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1988, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2006. The total number of elderly-headed households 
covered by the survey is more than 50,000 households. The paper looked at the impact of the 
presence of young dependents on the saving rate of the elderly headed households, controlling 
for other factors.   
 The results of the study show that the presence of young dependents (household members 
from 0 to 14 years) reduces the average saving rate of the elderly-headed household by about 2 
percentage points, all things being the same. This shows that rapid population growth, resulting 
in a large percentage of young dependents negatively affect the welfare of the elderly by 
lowering their household saving rate. This result, at household level, is consistent with the 
impact of the young dependents on economic growth – at the macro level – during the first phase 
of the demographic transition: that increased spending in investment on education and health of 
the young creates a big challenge to the economy as it will hinder economic growth.  
 
III. Population Dynamics and Poverty Incidence in the Elderly-Headed Households 
 
 To determine the effects of the number of young dependents on the welfare of the 
elderly-headed household, an econometric model is estimated using the pooled data on the 
elderly-headed households from the 2000, 2003 and 2006 Family Income and Expenditure 
Surveys (FIES).10 The figures in table 2 show the number of poor and non-poor elderly-headed 
households in the sample.11 The percentage of poor among the elderly-headed households 
increased in 2006 to 22% from the 2003 figure of 19.33%. While the 2006 poverty incidence 
among elderly-headed household is slightly lower compared to the overall national poverty 
incidence among families, estimated at 26.9%, the Pearson chi-square test shows that the 
percentage of poor among the elderly-headed households is significantly higher in 2006 
compared to the figures in 2003 (19.33%) and 2000 (20.68%). 
 
 
Table 2. Poor and Non-Poor Elderly-Headed Households from 2000, 2003 and 2006 FIES   
Year Poor Non-Poor Total 
  n % n  %   
2000 1,917 20.68 7,351 79.32 9,268 
2003 1,539 19.33 6,422 80.67 7,961 
2006 1,844 22.02 6,529 77.98 8,373 
Total 5,300 20.70 20,302 79.30 25,602 
Pearson Chi-Square Statistic 18.01 p-value 0.0000 
Sources: FIES (2000, 2003 and 2006), NSO; National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB), Authors’ 
Computation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
10
 Only the data from the 2000, 2003 and 2006 FIES are used in building the econometric model to maintain the 
consistency in the definition of poor households.   
11
 The poor refers to the families whose income falls below the poverty threshold as computed by the National Statistical 
Coordination Board (NSCB).  
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Econometric Model of Poverty Incidence in the Elderly-Headed Households  
 
The econometric model used in analyzing the impact of the presence of young dependents in the 
elderly-headed household is the logit model. Consider the linear model,  
   
 
 
 
where the variable of interest, yi, takes on the value 1 if the elderly-headed household is poor and 
value 0 if the elderly-headed household is non-poor and X1, X2,…, Xk represent the determinants 
of the elderly-headed household being poor.  
 
Note that yi is a Bernoulli random variable with probability of success,pi, or yi ~ Be(pi).  The problem in 
economics is that most likely pi is unknown and not constant across the observations.  
 
The solution is to make pi dependent on Xi. Thus, we have,  
 
 
 
 
where the function F(·) has the property that maps β0+β1X1+β2X2+…+βkXk onto the interval 
[0,1]. Thus, instead of considering the precise value of y, we are now interested on the 
probability that y = 1, given the outcome of β0+β1X1+β2X2+…+βkXk , or, 
 
 
 
 
where F is a continuous, strictly increasing function and returns a value ranging from 0 to 1. The 
choice of F determines the type of binary model. Given such a specification, the parameters of 
this model (the betas) can be estimated using the method of maximum likelihood. Once the 
identifiable parameters are established, the likelihood function is written as, 
 
 
 
 
 
where F(.) is a cumulative density function with mean zero.  
 
To complete the model we need to specify F and it is common to select either a standard normal 
distribution (probit model), or a logistic distribution (logit model). 
 
If F(·) is standard normal distribution then,  
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In the case of the LOGIT model with a single explanatory variable the probability of success is 
given by, 
 
 
 
 
 
The parameters of the model are estimated using Maximum Likelihood (ML). Using the 
likelihood function, 
 
 
 
 
We can obtain an expression for the log-likelihood, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Differentiating the log-likelihood function with respect to the parameter vector β and set the 
vector of derivatives equal to zero: 
 
 
 
 
 
where f(.) is the probability density function associated with the F(.). Simplifying, we have, 
 
 
 
 
 
Combining the two terms inside the brackets, we have, 
 
 
 
 
 
In the logit model we can simplify the last equation using the fact that, 
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The simplification yields: 
 
 
 
 
 
The likelihood equations associated with the logit (and probit) models are non-linear in the 
parameters. Simple closed-form expressions for the ML estimators are not available, so they 
must be solved using numerical algorithms.  
 
Marginal Effects 
 
Interpretation of the coefficient values is complicated by the fact that estimated coefficients from 
a binary model cannot be interpreted as marginal effect on the dependent variable.  
 
The marginal effect of Xj on the conditional probability is given by, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where f(·) is the density function corresponding to F(·). In here, βj is weighted by a factor f(·) 
that depends on the values of all the regressors in X. The direction of the effect of a change in Xj 
depends only on the sign of the βj coefficient. Positive values of βj imply that increasing Xj will 
increase the probability of the response, while negative values of βj will decrease the probability 
of the response. The marginal effect is usually estimated using the average of all the values of the 
explanatory variables (X) as the representative values in the estimation. 
 
Average Marginal Effect 
 
Some researchers (particularly Bartus (2005)) argue that it would be more preferable to compute 
the average marginal effect, that is, the average of each individual’s marginal effect. The 
marginal effect computed at the average X is different from the average of the marginal effect 
computed at the individual X.  
 
Explanatory Variables (Determinants of Poverty Incidence in Elderly-Headed Households) 
 
The explanatory variables (X) used to explain the poverty incidence in the elderly-headed 
households include: the number of young dependents in the household (aged 0 to 14), education 
of the household head, gender of the household head (indicator variable with values 1 if Male 
and 0 if Female), age of the household head, income transfer from abroad (as a percentage of 
total income), indicator variable for extended family (1 if the household has an extended family 
and 0 otherwise), time indicator variables (for the years 2000, 2003 and 2006), and regional 
indicator variables to account for regional differences (16 regions).  
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IV. Discussion of the Empirical Results 
 
 The figures in table 3A show the summary statistics of the variables in the model. The 
percentage of poor among the elderly-headed households in the sample is about 21%. The results 
also show that the average age of the elderly head of the household is about 69 years and that 
two-in-three of the households are headed by a male elderly. In terms of contribution of income 
from abroad (as a percentage of total income), about 8% of the average income of the elderly-
headed household is income transfer from abroad. The table also shows that about 40% of the 
elderly-headed household is considered as an extended family.       
 
Table 3A. Summary Statistics of the Variables in the Model   
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Household Classification (1 if Poor, 0 if Non-Poor)  25,602 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
 Income (in natural logarithm)  25,602 11.40 0.96 8.09 16.50 
 Age of the Household Head  25,602 68.71 7.07 60.00 99.00 
 Number of Young Dependents  25,602 0.87 1.27 0.00 13.00 
 Income from Abroad (as percentage of household income)  25,602 7.61 17.47 0.00 100.00 
 Type of Family (1 if Extended Family, 0 If Single Family)  25,602 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
 Gender of the Household Head (1 if Male, 0 if Female)  25,602 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00 
 
 
Table 3B shows highest educational attainment of the elderly household head. About two-thirds 
of the household heads (66.6%) only finished at most elementary, while only 8% of the 
household heads were able to complete their college education.    
 
 
Table 3B. Frequency Table of the Level of Education of the Elderly  
Level of Education N Percent 
      
No Education 2263 8.9 
Elementary Undergraduate 9024 35.3 
Elementary Graduate 5731 22.4 
High School Undergraduate 2197 8.6 
High School Graduate 2897 11.3 
College Undergraduate 1385 5.4 
College Graduated/Post Graduate 2049 8.0 
 
 
The figures in table 3C provide an interesting insight on the characteristics of a poor elderly-
headed household. The average number of young dependents (aged 0 to 14) is significantly 
higher among poor elderly-headed households (1.39) compared to the non-poor elderly-headed 
households (0.73). The econometric model will later support this result: that the presence of a 
young dependent in an elderly-headed household increases the probability of that household 
becoming poor, all things being the same. In terms of average age of the household head, the 
results in table 3C show no significant difference in the average age of the two groups of 
households. Another interesting result is the difference of income transfer from abroad (as 
percentage of total income) between the poor and non-poor elderly-headed households. The 
results show that on one hand, poor elderly-headed households received income transfer from 
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abroad equivalent to an average of 1.66% of its total income. On the other hand, non-poor 
elderly-headed households received about 9.16% of its total income from abroad.       
 
Table 3C. Comparison of Means of Selected Explanatory Variables  
Variable Poor Elderly-Headed Household   
Non-Poor Elderly  
Headed Household    
  Mean Std. Dev   Mean Std. Dev Remarks *  
Number of Young Dependents  1.39 1.60 
 
0.73 1.13 significantly different 
Age of the Household Head 68.59 7.05 
 
68.74 7.07 not significantly different 
Income from Abroad (as % of 
total income) 1.66 7.66  9.16 18.92 significantly different 
Income (in natural logarithm) 10.53 0.61  11.62 0.90 Significantly different 
* test results at the 5% level of significance 
 
 
The figures in tables 4A and 4B provide measures of association between household 
classification (poor/non-poor elderly-headed household) and the gender of the household; and 
the household classification and the type of family (single/extended). Table 4A shows significant 
association between the gender of the household head and whether the household is poor or non-
poor. The percentage of poor among male-headed households is 22.35% and is significantly 
higher compared to the percentage of female-headed households at 17.41%.  
 
 
Table 4A. Household Classification (Poor/Non-Poor) and Gender of the Household Head   
Gender of Household Head Poor Non-Poor Total 
  n % n  %   
Male 3,812 22.35 13,241 77.65 17,053 
Female 1,488 17.41 7,061 82.59 8,549 
Pearson Chi-Square Statistic 84.93 p-value 0.0000 
Sources: FIES (2000, 2003 and 2006), NSO; National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB), Authors’ 
Computation  
 
 
The information in table 4B shows that the percentage of poor among households with extended 
families (having two or more groups of families) is 23.38% and is significantly higher compared 
to the percentage of poor among single-family households at 18.93%. 
 
 
Table 4B. Household Classification (Poor/Non-Poor) and Type of Family   
Type of Family Poor Non-Poor Total 
  n % n  %   
Single 2,918 18.93 12,494 81.07 15,412 
Extended 2,382 23.38 7,808 79.30 10,190 
Pearson Chi-Square Statistic 73.75 p-value 0.0000 
Sources: FIES (2000, 2003 and 2006), NSO; National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB), Authors’ 
Computation  
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The results of the econometric model in table 5 show that presence of a young dependent 
in an elderly-headed household increases the probability that the household will become poor by 
about 9 percentage points (marginal effect), controlling for other factors. Moreover, if the 
elderly-headed household is an extended family (the elderly is supporting two or more 
households such as his children as well as his grandchildren), the probability of becoming poor 
increases by about 8.5 percentage points, all things being the same. The results of the analysis 
show that presence of young dependents negatively affects the welfare of the elderly, making 
them vulnerable to poverty, particularly when the elderly-headed household is supporting an 
extended family (the children and grandchildren). The results strengthen the argument in favour 
of a policy that will slow down the country’s rapid population growth. 
 
 
Table 5. Logistic Regression for Determinants of Poverty in Elderly-Headed Households 
Dependent Variable: Classification of the Elderly-Headed Household (1 if Poor; 0 Non-Poor)   
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Robust Std. Err. P-Value 
Marginal 
Effects 
Log of Income -3.220*** 0.050 0.000 -0.269 
Age of Household Head -0.028*** 0.003 0.000 -0.002 
Number of Dependents (aged 0 to 14) 1.0359*** 0.022 0.000 0.086 
Percentage of Income From Abroad -0.020*** 0.002 0.000 -0.002 
Extended Family Indicator 0.9930***   0.054 0.000 0.085 
Gender of Household Head (1 if Male) 1.0798**   0.051 0.000 0.086 
Elementary Undergraduate -0.086  0.071 0.223 -0.007 
Elementary Graduate -0.322***   0.081 0.000 -0.027 
High School Undergraduate -0.373***    0.105 0.000 -0.030 
High School Graduate -0.813***    0.108 0.000 -0.063 
College Undergraduate -1.063***    0.192 0.000 -0.079 
College Graduate and Post Graduate -1.211***    0.240 0.000 -0.088 
Indicator for Year 2003 -0.042   0.054 0.434 -0.004 
Indicator for Year 2006 0.7971***   0.053 0.000 0.068 
Constant 34.244*** 0.632 0.000 0.000 
Number of Observations 
 
25574 
Log Pseudo Likelihood Value 
 
-6812.51 
Wald’s Statistics (distributed as chi-square with 29 d.f. 
 
5277.130 
P-value 
 
0.000 
Pseudo R-squared 
 
0.478 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
The Time base category is Year 2000 and the regional base category is NCR. 
The regional indicators are excluded in the table. All regional indicators are significant at the 10% level, except for 
regions 1, 14 and 16. Of the significant regional indicators, only ARMM has a significantly higher coefficient than 
the base category. 
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The results also show that if the head of the household is male, it increases the probability 
of that household becoming poor by about 9 percentage points, all things being the same. 
Moreover, increasing income transfer from abroad (as percentage of total income) is an 
important determinant of poverty. This result supports the notion that having an OFW-member 
of the household is a way out of poverty.  
 
The regression results also show the importance of education as an instrument against 
poverty. If the head of the household was able to finish elementary education, the probability of 
the household becoming poor decreases by 2.7 percentages points compared to a household head 
without education or has not finished elementary education, all things being the same. The 
decrease in the probability of becoming poor becomes substantial when the household head is 
able to finish college education, where the probability of becoming poor drops by about 9 
percentage points, ceteris paribus.        
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 The prospect of an ageing population or demographic winter, while currently occurring at 
various stages in developed countries, is neither a concern nor a threat to the Philippines. The 
country’s current population age structure classifies the country as a young population and at the 
first stage of the demographic transition, with all the economic challenges that characterize a 
country with a large percentage of young dependents. These challenges also hinder our long term 
economic growth. 
 
 At the household level, the rapid population growth resulting in a large percentage of 
young dependents negatively affects the welfare of the elderly, decreasing their saving rate and 
making them vulnerable to poverty, particularly when the elderly-headed household is 
supporting an extended family (the children and grandchildren). In addition, the country’s 
inadequate social security mechanism, especially for the elderly, creates an additional problem. 
If we have an effective social security system, then so-called demographic winter would not be a 
problem.    
 
The major policy concern that should be addressed immediately is how to speed up the 
demographic transition, from the first phase to the second phase, in order to harvest the 
demographic dividend quickly. Experiences from countries that have benefited from the 
demographic dividend point to the need for government support, such as providing contraceptive 
services and accurate information, to accelerate voluntary reduction in fertility rates as quickly as 
possible. Public policies should be proactive in assisting, particularly the poor households, in 
achieving a voluntary reduction in fertility rates. 
 
The business as usual attitude towards the country’s bourgeoning population is 
unacceptable. The damage that a rapid population growth will bring to this generation and the 
next are irreversible. The immediate danger is the country’s rapid population growth, not the 
prospect of a demographic winter. 
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